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The EU-Ukraine Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation: 
an assessment of Ukraine’s readiness
Marta Jaroszewicz
The Action Plan on visas adopted during the recent EU-Ukraine summit 
is a success for Ukraine. It is the first time that Kyiv has succeeded in 
obtaining a definition of the conditions and criteria whose fulfilment will 
enable Ukraine to apply for the lifting of EU visas for its citizens. Ukraine's 
strong point has been its political will; the lifting of this visa regime has 
been a priority for all Ukrainian governments since 2005. Since Viktor 
Yanukovych became president, Ukraine has adopted or prepared key legal 
acts that brought it nearer to European standards in the area of border and 
migration management. One of Kyiv's strengths is also its relatively well 
reformed and efficiently managed border service. Moreover, illegal transit 
migration via Ukraine is decreasing, and fewer Ukrainians are trying to 
enter or stay in the EU illegally. Also, Kyiv has efficiently implemented the 
EU-Ukraine readmission agreement.
The hardest task for Ukraine will be to meet the EU’s expectations con-
cerning values, the condition of Ukrainian democracy, and the rule of 
law. Corruption remains the main barrier to Ukraine's development and 
modernisation; the courts are weak and the judicial system inefficient. 
The main undertaking of the new migration service that is being formed 
at the moment will be to create a civil system of registration, monito-
ring and regulating the stays of foreign nationals. This may prove difficult, 
as the supervisory authority (the Ministry of the Interior) remains an unre-
formed, police-type bureaucratic institution. Ukraine is lagging behind 
countries such as Russia, Belarus and Moldova when it comes to the in-
troduction of biometric documents. Another problem is the lack of an elec-
tronic information system on foreign nationals, visas and border crossings 
which would be accessible to all the relevant services and institutions.
For these reasons, the complete abolition of visas seems to be a long-
term perspective, especially considering that many EU countries, which 
themselves are faced with the problem of migrants’ integration, are rather 
sceptical about the further liberalisation of movement of people with their 
eastern neighbours. In the immediate future, if Ukraine meets some of the 
requirements set by the EU, it will be able to seek the extension of the visa 
facilitations that have been in operation since 2008.
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An assessment of the document
The Action Plan towards visa liberalisation for Ukraine, adopted on 22 November 2010 
during the EU-Ukraine summit, does not differ substantially from the road maps granted to 
the Western Balkan states in 2008 (the citizens of these states recently obtained visa-free 
entry to the EU). In both cases, meeting the requirements set by the European Commission 
did not automatically bring the abolition of visas. Also, visa liberalisation was in both cases 
made dependent on the level of risk of illegal migration to the EU, that is, on the visa refusal 
rate and the number of citizens apprehended and returned.
Thus, Ukraine has received a relatively standard document which sets quite strict requ-
irements in five key spheres: document security including biometrics, illegal migration in-
cluding readmission, public order and security, external relations and fundamental rights. 
What is new is the division of these requ-
irements into two groups. The document 
singles out the requirements related to the 
introduction of relevant legal changes and 
the preparation of reforms on one hand, 
and the requirements related to the actual 
implementation of these reforms on the 
other. Ukraine’s ability to fulfil the condi-
tions of the second category will depend 
on the decision of the European Commission and the Council. This provision of the Action 
Plan reduces Ukraine's chances of getting a visa-free regime soon, since it will have to pass 
through a long-term decision-making process in the European Commission, the Council 
and the European Parliament, as well as receive the initial approval of EU institutions. 
Another novel provision was the European Commission's assessment of Ukraine's progress 
in tandem with the assessment of how visa liberalisation may affect the EU’s security in the 
context of the risk of illegal migration from Ukraine. This condition reflects the scepticism 
of many EU states (especially Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and France) about lifting 
the visa regime for Ukraine.
Ukraine's strong points
Ukraine's strong points in its negotiations with the EU are above all its political will (Kyiv 
abolished visas for EU citizens back in 2005), its efficiency in legislative work, its relatively 
efficient border service, and decreasing illegal migration into the EU. Moreover, Kyiv suc-
ceeded in meeting the obligations of the readmission agreement with the EU, which came 
into full force on 1 January 2010.
Visa-free travel to the EU for Ukraine's citizens has been a priority for all Ukrainian go-
vernments since 2005, and it became even more urgent after the neighbouring EU states 
joined the Schengen zone. However, during the rule of the 'orange coalition', internal di-
sputes prevented the adoption of basic bills that were supposed to bring Ukraine nearer to 
the Schengen legislation (the only positive step was the adoption in 2009 of the law on 
border control, compatible with EU standards). There was also a legal dispute (spanning 
two years) that concerned the creation of a migration service. As a result, the system of 
migration management was plunged into chaos, and Ukraine was unable to fulfil its basic 
international commitments, such as granting refugee status.
The Action Plan towards visa liberali-
sation for Ukraine, adopted on 
22 November 2010 during the EU- 
-Ukraine summit, does not differ sub-
stantially from the road maps granted 
to the Western Balkan states in 2008. 
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Within the last ten months, since President Yanukovych took power, Ukraine has adopted 
or prepared key legal acts that have brought it closer to European standards in the area of 
border and migration management. First of all, the strategy of integrated border manage-
ment has been prepared and passed through the parliament at express pace. This is the 
main strategic document that prepares Ukraine to leave behind the post-Soviet system of 
border control and join the four-tier model of border management operational in the EU 
(activities in the third countries, cooperation with neighbouring states, border control, 
inland activities). Relevant legal amendments have also been prepared to break the legisla-
tive deadlock around the migration service. The presidential decree of 9 December 2010 
meant to reform central government institutions in Ukraine has established the State Migra-
tion Service (under the Ministry of the Interior), which is to carry out work in the fields of 
citizenship policy, immigration, registration and asylum. This means that most of the tasks 
related to immigration policy will be performed by one institution. The new government 
has also introduced the legal amendments 
and institutional changes related to per-
sonal data protection that were necessary 
to launch the process of issuing biometric 
documents.
Ukraine can also boast a relatively well 
reformed and efficiently managed State 
Border Guard Service (SBGS). This se-
rvice has succeeded in steering clear of 
political turbulence and frequent organi-
sational changes, which is the fate that 
befell the migration service. In the last five 
years, SBGS supported by EU assistance 
programs, has been reforming quite efficiently. The process of transforming the service from 
a military formation into a law enforcement agency has been almost completed. The servi-
ce has undergone a process of professionalisation. It has also adopted new, non-military 
standards of recruitment, training and career development. Structural changes in the border 
service are underway, and their most important result have been the establishment of new 
organisational units at the tactical level (border units) who will deal with both border control 
and the border surveillance. Progress has been made in regulating the legal status of the 
Ukrainian borders: an agreement was signed with Russia on demarcating the land border, 
and Belarus has ratified the state border treaty. All these changes have notably increased 
the efficiency of border protection, and it must be added that Ukraine's western borders 
are its best protected. On the eastern borders there are deficiencies of infrastructure, equ-
ipment and well-trained staff, although significant progress has been noted within the last 
few years. It is equally important that border protection in becoming more of a technical 
than a political issue in Russian-Ukrainian relations.
Ukrainian aspirations to a visa-free regime with the EU are supported by the improving 
migration situation. Within the last few years illegal transit migration via Ukraine has decre-
ased, and the number of people apprehended for illegal border crossing has been steadily 
decreasing. In 2008, the border service apprehended 4,800 people attempting to cross the 
border illegally; in 2009 this number fell to 3,600, and in the first eight months of 2010 it 
was 1,800. Moreover, fewer Ukrainians are attempting to illegally enter or stay in the EU. 
Ukraine's strong points in its nego-
tiations with the EU are above all its 
political will (Kyiv abolished visas for 
EU citizens back in 2005), its effi-
ciency in legislative work, its relatively 
efficient border service, and decre-
asing illegal migration into the EU. 
Moreover, Kyiv succeeded in meeting 
the obligations of the readmission 
agreement  with the EU, which came 
into full force on 1 January 2010.
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This is mainly due to increasing chances of obtaining legal status in EU countries (migrant 
regularisation campaigns have been carried out in Southern European states, and Poland 
and the Czech Republic have simplified their regulations concerning the employment of 
foreigners). Falling rate of visa refusals in the EU states' consulates illustrates the declining 
visa risk posed by Ukrainian citizens. In 2009, the visa refusal rate was about 5 percent of 
all visa applications (the EU considers 3 percent to be a safe threshold for visa refusals). 
For comparison, the rate for Moldova and Armenia was about 10-12 percent, and for Russia, 
Belarus and Azerbaijan about 3 percent.
After a year of the full operation of the readmission agreement between Ukraine and the 
EU, it can be stated that Kyiv has been executing this agreement pretty smoothly, as was 
actually noted in the Action Plan. Ukraine may owe this efficiency to the fact that relatively 
few people have been readmitted from the EU states; nevertheless Kyiv has admitted the 
vast majority of them. It should be noted that the readmission agreement Ukraine signed 
was highly favourable to the EU. Among other things, Ukraine has agreed to take back tho-
se immigrants who illegally remained on EU territory, even if they had left Ukraine legally. 
Even though implementing protocols to the agreement have not yet been prepared, 
the accelerated procedure for returning people apprehended within 48 hours of crossing 
the border (which concerns most cases of people readmitted to Ukraine) is being executed 
efficiently and without delay. There is some more trouble with executing the standard pro-
cedure, for which Ukraine's lack of computerised databases is to blame.
Ukraine's weaknesses
The hardest task for Ukraine will be to meet the EU's expectations concerning values, 
the condition of Ukrainian democracy, and the rule of law. Some dangerous phenomena, 
such as the restriction of political pluralism, the concentration of power in the hands of the 
president, and the use of law enforcement agencies and courts in political struggles have 
not gone unnoticed. Even though the criteria related to the rule of law and judicial indepen-
dence have not been directly referred to in the Action Plan, Kyiv has to fundamentally recon-
struct its legal system if it wants to cooperate with EU member states effectively on criminal 
matters. This reconstruction would include improving the qualifications of judges, changing 
the legal system, which is now based mostly on regulations (and not laws passed by the 
parliament), improving the inefficient judicial system, and reforming the prosecutor's office. 
Even though Ukrainian law states that the maximum period for detention without charge is 
72 hours, illegal immigrants apprehended 
in Ukraine are often kept for much longer 
without the permission of a court.
As for the specific criteria, Ukraine may 
have greatest trouble with meeting the re-
quirements concerning the creation of an 
effective system to combat corruption, the 
institutional changes concerning migration 
management, and the reform of the Mini-
stry of the Interior. Ukraine will also have to face the challenges connected to introducing 
biometric documents and establishing a common database for all the services operating 
in the field of border and migration management.
Even though Ukrainian law states 
that the maximum period for de-
tention without charge is 72 hours, 
illegal immigrants apprehended 
in Ukraine are often kept for much 
longer without the permission 
of a court.
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Most Ukrainian politicians admit that corruption remains a major barrier to the development 
and modernisation of Ukraine. During the Anti-Corruption Committee session in October 
2010, President Viktor Yanukovych declared that corruption is a threat to national security. 
Corruption is widespread; both the administrative corruption faced by citizens every day, and 
the so-called ‘grand’ corruption where politics meets business. In 2010, in the Corruption 
Perception Index by the Transparency International, Ukraine ranked 134th among the 179 co-
untries surveyed. So far, there does not seem to be enough political will to prove the govern-
ment's intention to battle this phenomenon. Kyiv is failing to meet its obligations to its mem-
bership in the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO). For several years now, Ukraine 
has been unable to adopt anti-corruption legislation. In mid-2009, at the initiative of the then 
President Yushchenko, the parliament adopted a package of anti-corruption bills, whose en-
try into force was delayed twice (first, until 1 January 2010, and later until 1 January 2011). 
In October 2010, the Constitutional Court declared part of the provisions unconstitutional. 
On 23 December, the parliament adopted 
at first reading the new anti-corruption 
legislation prepared by the Presidential 
Administration, which (according to the 
Ukrainian opposition) hardly differs from 
the provisions adopted in 2009. In Febru-
ary 2010, President Yanukovych set up 
the National Anti-Corruption Committee, 
although the committee has only had one 
session throughout the year, and its func-
tions are mostly advisory.
The recent decision to set up the migration service is just a first step towards the creation 
of an effective system of migration management. The main problem of the new service will 
be the creation of a civil system for registering foreigners, issuing residence permits, gran-
ting refugee status, monitoring the migration situation, and coordinating migration policy 
in a situation when its supervisory authority (the Ministry of the Interior) remains an unrefor-
med, police-type bureaucratic institution, which is focused on combating illegal migration 
rather than legalising migrants. The idea to leave tasks such as combating illegal migration 
and cross-border crime (usually dealt with by the police) within the remit of the new service 
seems to have been a bad idea. Ukraine has created a relatively effective system of appre-
hension and detention of illegal immigrants, but it will now have to face other problems, 
such as dealing with delays in granting refugee status, integration of migrants, the expulsion 
of undesired persons, and granting temporary residence to migrants who cannot or should 
not be returned. It also seems that the Ukrainian government has put too much effort into 
preparing a state migration strategy that should have the status of a legal act (work on this 
document has been ongoing for many years). Ukraine's migration system does not seem 
to be firm, and so it will be hard to regulate with one legal act. At the moment it would be 
better to adopt a political document at the governmental level.
Ukraine is lagging behind countries such as Russia, Belarus and Moldova regarding the 
introduction of biometric documents. Attempts to adopt the relevant legislation in 2007– 
–2009 have failed due to the permanent political crisis, as have efforts to prepare perso-
nal data protection system and passports’ production. In 2011, the government adopted 
the plan for introducing the biometrics. However, Ukraine is still in the initial phase of 
the process, whereas the possession of a biometric passport is a necessary condition for 
the possible visa-free entry of Ukrainian citizens to the EU. Another problem is the lack 
The hardest task for Ukraine will 
be to meet the EU's expectations 
concerning values, the condition 
of Ukrainian democracy, and the rule 
of law. Corruption is widespread; 
both the administrative corruption 
faced by citizens every day, 
and the so-called ‘grand’ corruption 
where politics meets business.
i s s u e  4 5  |  1 7 . 0 1 . 2 0 1 1  |  c e N T R e  f O R  e A s T e R N  s T u d i e s
cOMMeNTARyOsw
6OSW.WAW.PL
The Centre for Eastern Studies (CES) was established in 1990. CES is financed from the budget. 
The Centre monitors and analyses the political, economic and social situation in Russia, Central 
and Eastern European countries, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Central Asia. 
CES focuses on the key political, economic and security issues, such as internal situations 
and stability of the mentioned countries, the systems of power, relations between political 
centres, foreign policies, issues related to NATO and EU enlargement, energy supply security, 
existing and potential conflicts, among other issues. 
The views expressed by the authors of the papers do not necessarily reflect the opinion of Polish authorities. 
Centre for Eastern Studies
Koszykowa 6A, 
00-564 Warsaw
e-mail: info@osw.waw.pl 
© Copyright by OSW
Editors: Adam Eberhardt, 
Katarzyna Kazimierska
Translation: Jadwiga Rogoża
Co-operation: Jim Todd
DTP: Wojciech Mańkowski
of an electronic system with a database on foreign nationals, visas and border crossings 
which would be accessible to all relevant services and institutions. The Ukrainian border 
service and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have their own databases that are not compatible 
with the databases of other institutions. The Ministry of the Interior has created its own da-
tabase which is intended to be integrated with those of other institutions, but its completion 
is progressing very slowly.
Conclusions. Prospects for visa liberalisation
Immediately after the EU–Ukraine summit, President Yanukovych announced that Ukra-
ine would be able to meet the requirements set by the Action Plan as early as the first 
half of 2011. This seems impossible, considering Ukraine's unpreparedness to meet the 
Action Plan’s exacting requirements. Moreover, the document assumes that the first as-
sessment of Kyiv's progress will be made right in the middle of 2011. It should also be 
borne in mind that many EU member states are rather unfavourably disposed towards the 
idea of further visa liberalisation, as they find it hard to cope with migrants’ integration, 
and are unwilling to accept more migrants. Finally, another country seeking a visa-free re-
gime with the EU is Russia, whose advantage over Ukraine is its powerful lobby in some 
EU states, and has a lower visa refusal rate in its relations with the EU. Russia can also 
boast an efficient migration service and has introduced biometric passports.
It seems that by the turn of 2012, Ukraine should be ready to meet the first group of 
requirements set by the Action Plan, which relate to the introduction of relevant legal 
amendments and preparation of reforms. So if the initial assessment of Ukraine's pro-
gress is positive, the government in Kyiv may have a chance to extend the current visa 
facilitation agreement. For example, the categories of persons subject to visa facilitation 
could be extended, whereas the number of documents required for obtaining a visa could 
be reduced, and visa fees could be lowered. Special liberalised visa regulations or rules 
for crossing the border could be applied during the European Football Championship in 
2012. Such decisions are likely to be approved of by EU member states, as they do not 
increase migration risks, and meet Ukraine's European aspirations.
The complete abolition of visas within the next few years is not an unrealistic perspecti-
ve. Ukraine's migration situation is tending to stabilise (both in terms of transit migration 
and the number of Ukrainians whose status on EU territory is unregulated), whereas its 
progress in border protection and migration management system is considerable. From 
Kyiv's viewpoint, it is crucial to convince the EU states that Ukraine is earnestly fighting 
corruption, and that European law enforcement authorities and courts can find trustwor-
thy partners in Ukraine who will operate according to similar standards.
